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Legal propositions to the Dissertation 
HOCUS-POCUS: LOOK, BUT DO NOT SEE! 
A comparative analysis of the transparency rules and their failure to fight 
corruption in the Bulgarian public procurement system 
 by Irena Georgieva 
 
1. The clearer, less ambiguous and less interpretative the legislative framework 
regulating public procurement, the easier it is to detect corruption chicanery. 
2. When a certain element of the procedure is left to the full discretion of the 
contracting authority the door to corruption remains wide open. 
3. Decrease of corruption goes hand in hand with the existence of political will. 
4. Decrease of corruption depends directly on the presence of disciplining 
sanctions, which to predominate over incentive norms. 
5. Efficient and independent control of the appellate authorities needs to be 
established, designed specifically to prevent and detect corruption in public 
procurement. 
6. Reducing the human factor in the award process should be a priority. 
7. When using the ‘most economically advantageous tender’, the fantasy of 
contracting authorities and bidders with corrupt intent stretches much further. 
8. Corruption is a matter of mentality and is strongly conditioned by historical and 
social predispositions. 
 
